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John Hogan 
 
A Comparative Examination of the Nature 
of Change in Macroeconomic Policies 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the impact of economic crises on macroeconomic policies in Ireland in the 
late 1950s and Sweden in the early 1980s, framed within the context of the policy change 
literature.  Each of these countries‟ responses to the crises affecting them, tempered as they were 
by historical and political factors, provides valuable insights into their political economies.  These 
findings enable us to compare and contrast the nature of each crisis and the policy responses 
adopted.  The value of such comparison is in the perspective it offers, contributing to the goal of 
building a body of increasingly complete explanatory theory (Mahler, 1995).   
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines the impact of economic crises on macroeconomic policies in Ireland in the 
1950s and Sweden in the early 1980s, framed within the context of the policy change literature.  
These cases were selected for examination based upon the criteria of “most similar” and “most 
different”.  Employing the criteria of “most similar,” we selected from states that have been 
stable democracies since the first half of the 20th century and were founding members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  These conditions tie 
together the principles of representative democracy and free market economy.  For the criteria of 
“most different,” we utilized Lijphart‟s (1999) categories of majoritarian and consensual 
democracies.  This category permits us to control for varying institutional arrangements.  By 
employing this approach we are trying to ensure that the cases examined, though not identical, 
are comparable.   
Ireland and Sweden are small, long-standing, democracies and encompass parliamentary, 
republican, constitutional monarchical and unitary systems of governance.  They are both 
peripheral European states, as well as being small economies.  Despite their similarities, in the 
periods in which we examine them, their economic performances contrasted sharply.  Sweden 
was a prosperous welfare state during much of the latter half of the 20th century, while Ireland 
struggled to achieve sustained economic growth.  Nevertheless, their similarities ensure “the 
contexts of analysis are analytically equivalent, to a significant degree, while their differences place 
the parallel processes of change in sharp relief” (Collier, 1997: 40).   
 Macroeconomic policies were selected for examination as commentators (academics and 
journalists) tend to focus primarily upon macroeconomic policy instruments, while dealing with 
the broader sweep of policies affected at the time would have required more space that is 
available here.  Each country‟s response to the crisis afflicting it, tempered as it was by a 
combination of historical and political factors, provides an insight into that political economy.  
These findings enable us to compare and contrast the nature of each crisis and the policy 
responses each country adopted.  Through studying politics comparatively we can discover trends 
and achieve an understanding of broader characteristics (Blondel, 1995: 3). Thus, the value of 
comparison is in the perspective it offers and its goal of building a body of increasingly complete 
explanatory theory (Mahler 1995; Mayer et al. 1993).   
 
2. The Policy Change Literature 
Policy change is a complex process and must be seen in the context of societal and political 
change (Feldstein, 1994).  A crisis implies prevailing policies cannot be sustained without 
deterioration (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 14).  An economic crisis can influence policy 
preferences leading to policy change (Stevenson, 2001: 621).  Due to the complexities in trying to 
understand the nature of policy change, the issue has been approached from a variety of 
perspectives. 
Advocacy collation theory focuses on coalitions sharing core policy beliefs, on policy-
oriented learning and on external system events to explain radical policy change (Meijerink, 2005: 
1061).  An advocacy coalition consists of “elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, 
researchers who share a particular belief system” (Sabatier, 1988: 139).  The epistemic 
communities explanation focuses on networks of individuals who share policy relevant 
knowledge as they seek to achieve policy change (Haas, 1992: 3).  According to the advocacy 
coalition approach, for policy change to occur, an external shock is required, such as a 
macroeconomic crisis (Sabatier and Jenkins-Simth 1999; Nohrstedt, 2005: 1042).  For the 
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epistemic community approach, policy change may be triggered by uncertainty over the 
seriousness of problems in the polity (Meijerink, 2005: 1063). 
Based on the concept of windows of opportunity the policy streams approach to policy 
change incorporates a role for the policy entrepreneur in engendering change (Kingdon, 1995; 
Zahariadis, 1999). Windows of opportunity arise due to exogenous shocks (Garrett and Lange, 
1995).  For policy change to occur, when a window of opportunity forms, policy entrepreneurs 
attempt to gain political support for the solutions they put forward (Zahariadis, 1999).  To do 
this, policy entrepreneurs link problems, ideas and politics to draw attention to issues and bring 
them onto government agendas (Mintrom and Norman, 2009: 655). 
For Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the process of policy change is marked by long 
periods of stability disrupted by instances of radical change.  The punctuated equilibrium 
approach illustrates how policy entrepreneurs opposed to extant policy develop alternative ideas 
and seek support for this new idea.  For policy change to occur, opponents of extant policy must 
create new perceptions of the issue at stake and search for support for their newly created policy 
ideas (Meijerink, 2005: 1064).  Should a board range of these societal actors perceive the 
paradigm underlying extant policy is inadequate, then ideational collapse will occur (Legros, 2000: 
419).  However, “even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a 
replacement could produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy” 
(Legro, 2000: 424).  Thus, in the wake of policy failure and ideational collapse, there is no 
guarantee that a new idea will become policy.  The critical junctures framework, developed by 
Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008), formalized this argument.  It posits that a critical juncture is 
made up of three sequential events: crisis, ideational change and policy change.   
A growing body of literature is devoted to identifying aspects of incremental policy 
change.  This recognises continuity during upheavals and gradual change in times of peace that 
eventually become transformative (Djelic and Quack, 2003: 309–10; Thelen, 2004: 292).  
Institutions and policies change in subtle, but often significant ways, by a variety of mechanisms, 
including layering, conversion, displacement and drift.  Layering is the placing of new 
constituents in established institutional frameworks.  Conversion is the integration of new groups 
into institutions, forcing change in the roles these institutions perform.  Displacement occurs 
when new models emerge, calling into question existing organizations (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 
19), while drift refers the absence of institutional stability (Thelen, 2004).  As Sheingate (2003: 
186) argues, to provide a nuanced account of policy change, we must move beyond the 
conception of institutions as bastions of equilibrium. 
 Thus, the literature looks primarily at the importance of external shocks for initiating 
policy change.  However, policy change may be triggered by uncertainty as to the problems in the 
economy.  The key players in policy change literature are policy and political entrepreneurs and 
coalitions of actors sharing a common belief or policy relevant knowledge.  The key concept in 
the policy change literature is ideas, extant ideas that underlie existing policies and alternative 
ideas that attack current policies.  Thus, the literature sees these components as critical to the 
policy change process. 
 
 
3. Ireland 1950s – The State of the Economy 
After independence in 1922 the first Irish Free State government employed a free trade policy, 
centered on agriculture.  However, after Fianna Fáil came to power in 1932, in the depths of the 
Great Depression, economic policy came to focus upon protectionism and developing domestic 
industries behind tariff barriers.  This was a process underway in many countries at the time, 
however Irish protectionism was driven by cultural isolationist factors related to the country‟s 
history as a British colony.  The view that political independence could be a key determinant of 
economic progress had huge influence on the ideas that shaped the economic nationalism 
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underlying Fianna Fail‟s protectionist policy from the 1930s onwards (Ó Tuathaigh, 1986).  
Independence came to be equated with an economic nationalism that manifested itself in 
protectionism.  The naivety was that just because economic policy was homemade did not make 
it better.  For Ireland, the benefits of protectionism – meagre industrial expansion – had been 
reaped by the 1940s (Haughton, 1995).  By the 1950s, Irish industry was supplying as much of 
the domestic market as it could and the opportunities for expanding employment further were 
limited.  The OECD (1958: 15) stated that development in the industrial sector, in spite of some 
changes, depended on a small and static home market. 
Table 1 shows that debt/GNP ratio deteriorated between 1951 and 1959 and the level of 
economic openness reached a decade long low in 1959.  For the other four indicators, their low 
points came at various times during the 1950s.  Unemployment peaked at almost 10 percent in 
1953.  However, this figure conceals the tens of thousands of people emigrating annually.  In 
1951, inflation peaked at over 11 percent, while by 1959 the economy experienced deflation.  The 
economy shrank by over 2 percent in 1958, having previously contracted in 1956, with only 
anemic growth in 1957.  Between 1951 and 1958 GDP rose by less than 1 percent per annum, 
employment declined by 12 percent and the population dropped to its lowest ever level 
(Haughton, 1995).  From this table it is clear that the Irish economy was in crisis.   
 
Table 1: Ireland‟s Main Economic Indicators, 1950 – 1960  
Year Unemploy- 
ment 
Inflation Government 
Debt to GNP  
Growth Rates 
in Real GDP 
Industrial 
Disputes days 
lost  
Economic 
Openness1 
 % % ratio % („000s)  
1950 7.5 0.0 N/A 1.9 217 70.9 
1951 7.3 11.25 49.9 1.9 545 82.6 
1952 9.1 10.1 N/A 2.26 529 69.6 
1953 9.6 2.04 N/A 2.5 82 66.9 
1954 8.1 2.0 N/A 0.9 67 65.5 
1955 6.8 1.9 N/A 1.9 236 67.2 
1956 7.7 4.4 N/A -1.45 48 63.9 
1957 9.2 2.57 N/A 0.98 92 62.7 
1958 8.6 2.6 N/A -2.2 126 62.9 
1959 8.0 -0.85 55.5 4.1 124 62.7 
1960 6.7 0.86 57.5 5.0 80 64.7 
Sources: Leddin, Anthony J., & B. M. Walsh.  1998.  The Macroeconomy of Ireland.  (4th ed.) Dublin: 
Gill & Macmillan; Mitchell, B. R.  1993.  International Historical Statistics.  Europe 1750-1988.  (3rd ed.) Hong 
Kong: Stockton Press; Eurostat Yearbook 1997.  Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities; Heston, A., Summers, R. & B. Aten.  2002.  Penn World Table Version 6.1, 
Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP). 
 
The OECD (1961: 5) and the Central Bank of Ireland (1961: 5) saw the 1950s as a time of 
economic depression.  Agricultural production was abnormally low, industrial output was 
faltering (OECD, 1961: 8) and there was a large external trade deficit (Central Bank of Ireland, 
1957: 27).  In a damning indictment of the economic situation, the Central Bank (1959: 32) stated 
that “a study of events during the past ten years, of the courses that have been pursued and of 
their consequences, is a necessary preliminary to the formulation of any sound proposals for the 
improvement of the national economy.”  The Central Bank (1957: 34) also observed that “the 
present economic and financial situation scarcely justifies the retention of confidence in large-
scale expenditure on public works and social amenities as a means of stimulating useful economic 
activity.”  This report spoke of the dangers of insolvency and the loss of economic sovereignty 
and how this would result in a level of emigration to dwarf anything previously experienced.   
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The national/international media expressed negative opinions on the economy.  The Irish 
Independent (1959a: 4) argued that the foundations of the economy were in need of repair.  Time 
International (1958: 44) remarked that there had been few economic advances for Ireland during 
the 1950s.  The Irish Times (1959a: 9) observed that employment in the economy was in decline 
and the cost of living had gone “sky high”.  The Economist (1959: 15) concluded that prior to 1959 
most indicators of Irish economic performance were dire.  It went on to argue that righting the 
economy would be the paramount task confronting the country.  The Sunday Press (1987: 12) 
referred to “a general economic collapse” in Ireland and a lack of will to tackle the problem.  By 
mid 1958 the Irish Independent (1958a: 11) was arguing that economic isolation was impractical.   
 
Figure 1: Unemployment, Inflation, GDP Growth Rates 
 
Sources: Leddin, Anthony J., & B. M. Walsh.  1998.  The Macroeconomy of Ireland.  (4th ed.) Dublin: 
Gill & Macmillan; Mitchell, B. R.  1993.  International Historical Statistics.  Europe 1750-1988.  (3rd ed.) Hong 
Kong: Stockton Press. 
 
 “In the 1950s, Ireland‟s relative [economic] performance was disastrous, poorer than that of the 
UK as well as the European average” (Ó Gráda and O‟Rourke, 1995: 214).  In 1957, 
manufacturing output was no higher than in 1953, while building activity was stagnant.  All 
activity in the industrial sector depended upon a static home market (OEEC, 1958: 15).  “By the 
middle of the 1950s a serious crisis of confidence developed, caused by widespread anxiety that 
the performance of the economy was so poor the country was falling behind Western European 
standards, not only in productivity, but in the social benefits productivity might be expected to 
confer” (Lyons, 1973: 618). 
According to Whitaker (1973: 415), by 1957, the economy was plumbing the depths of 
hopelessness.  Stop-go policies, in which adverse balance of payments signaled drastic fiscal 
actions were to follow, produced severe and unnecessary fiscal contractions in 1952 and 1957 
(Kennedy and Dowling, 1975).  In the late 1950s, the outlook for the economy was depressing, 
while the economies of Europe achieved strong growth (MacSharry and White, 2000: 14-19).  
4. Ireland 1950s – The Policy Response 
The economic stagnation of the 1950s led to a “vigorous debate on the economy” (O‟Day, 2000: 
27).  A questioning of protectionism was conducted at the national level among civil society 
groups and within the media.  This was justified by the need for additional capital to permit the 
expansion of industry, to increase employment and reduce emigration.  The Irish Independent 
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(1958b: 9) observed that there was a pressing need to increase exports.  The Federation of Irish 
Manufacturers (FIM) called for an investigation of the impact on Irish industry of a managed free 
trade regime (Irish Independent, 1958c: 10).  This debate was influenced by economists warning that 
if a free trade area was established in Europe, Ireland would have no option but to join 
(Ainsworth, 1956: 2).  By the late 1940s, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
was created and a few years later the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) came into 
existence.  Protectionism, acceptable in the context of the 1930s, was swimming against the tide 
of trade liberalization by the 1950s. 
In response, the collation government of Fine Gael and the Labour Party (1954-1957) 
initially stretched protectionist policy to incorporate aspects of attracting foreign investment and 
encouraging exports.  It was a last ditch effort to maintain some element of protectionism.  
However, Taoiseach John A. Costello came to realise that increasing employment would require 
foreign investment (The Irish Times, 1954: 9).  Thereafter, the Minister for Industry and 
Commerce, William Norton “signalled the growing need to attract foreign direct investment to 
facilitate industrial expansion” (Donnelly, 2007: 144).  Norton was to subsequently travel 
repeatedly to America seeking to attract investment in Ireland (Ainsworth, 1956: 2).  The Finance 
Act of 1956 was introduced to encourage exports by Irish and foreign owned companies 
(Donnelly, 2007: 145).  The Industrial Development Authority (IDA), established in 1949 to 
encourage indigenous industries, was permitted in 1956 to distribute grants to foreign owned 
export-orientated industries (Suarez, 2001).  Within a short time, the IDA was advocating export 
led industrialization, with foreign investment as its driving force.  Export Profit Tax Relief 
(EPTR) was introduced in 1956 at the level of 50 percent for 5 years (Breznitz, 2007: 152).  
EPTR sent two messages: first, Ireland was pro-enterprise through rewarding profit; second, the 
country favored a long-term investment (MacSharry and White, 2000: 246-7).  These alterations 
to protectionism were an admission by the government of the failure of the philosophy 
underlying this approach, as they contained a direct, if unintended, challenge to the philosophy‟s 
intellectual coherence (Tansey, 1998: 12).   
The protectionist policy matrix, made up of a range of different legislation, special import 
levies and customs duties, and developed over more than generation, was fraying (Donnelly, 
2007: 149-150).  Lynch (1959: 7) argued that as the old economic policies had failed what was 
needed was a new and clear sense of direction.  He suggested that closer economic cooperation 
with Britain was not at variance with Irish nationhood.  The Irish Times (1959d: 7) argued that 
the results of protectionism were twofold: the sheltering from competition of inefficient firms 
producing inferior goods and the resultant bad will Irish exporters had to face abroad.  In this 
fraught environment of disappointing economic performance and policy failure, existing 
ideational orthodoxy was contested and this, coupled with a general consensus among agents that 
this orthodoxy was inadequate, resulted in its collapse.  As a result, “1957 is conventionally 
thought of as the end of an era, making the final exhaustion of the ideas of the first generation of 
political leaders” (Garvin, 1982: 37).   
During the 1957 general election Fianna Fáil attacked the economic model it had created 
a generation before and the prevailing economic stagnation.  Senior Fianna Fáil politician Seán 
Lemass argued that increased employment would only come from exports and that this was 
possible by attracting in foreign capital and through tax exemption for exporting firms (The Irish 
Times, 1957a: 1).  Since the early 1950s, he had argued that tariffs and restrictions against foreign 
investment, that had long protected native industries, be revised (Savage, 1999: 18).  By early 
1955, Lemass was calling for a re-examination of economic policy.  Another member of Fianna 
Fáil, Erskin Childers, declared that 1957 was an election to make “tremendous changes to 
economic and national policy” and “unless exports were enormously increased Ireland would 
sink to a fourth rate state” (The Irish Times, 1957b: 5).   
Following Fianna Fáil‟s victory, Lemass, the new Minister for Industry and Commerce, 
“began the process of opening up the state to foreign investment” (Girvin, 1994: 125), a process 
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tentatively begun under the preceding coalition government (Donnelly, 2007: 140ff).  Lemass, 
who had once championed protectionism, under the influenced of T.K. Whitaker, Secretary of 
the Department of Finance, became convinced that “developing industry to supply the home 
market had reached its limit” (Donnelly, 2007: 154).  T. K. Whitaker was committed to a policy 
of export-led economic growth, a commitment that stemmed from his recognition that economic 
policies pursued to that time had failed (Lee, 1989: 343).  He advanced a three-pronged strategy 
within Finance – more planning, fewer tariff barriers and a greater emphasis on productive 
investment.  His document Economic Development, regarded as “a watershed in the modern 
economic history of the country” (Lyons, 1973: 628), proposed the gradual transition to free 
trade, the introduction of grants and tax concessions to encourage export orientated 
manufacturing and the inducement of direct investment by foreign export oriented 
manufacturers.  It stated “the policies, hitherto followed, though given a fair trial, have not 
resulted in a viable economy” (Economic Development, 1958: 2).  Economic Development marked 
the culmination of a major strand of activism within parts of the higher echelons of the civil 
service (Murphy, 1997).  It advocated the abandonment of the protectionist programme Fianna 
Fáil pioneered since the 1930s.  This was to prove the genesis of a new paradigm with which to 
manage the economy. 
Whitaker, Ireland‟s premier civil servant, was a powerful policy entrepreneur, as his ideas, 
as set out in Economic Development, formed the backbone of the 1958 government White Paper, 
First Programme for Economic Expansion (Horgan, 1997).   This document laid out a coherent set of 
economic ideas which argued that the way forward for the economy was through industrial 
expansion based on production for the export market.  Although Economic Development and the 
First Programme for Economic Expansion were vague as to policy instruments and targets, they 
presaged a new consensus on the need for a more outward-looking economic policy.   
Despite the recognition that extant policy had failed, few politicians, either in the 
government, or opposition, initially took notice of either policy document, apart from Leamss 
(Murphy, 2005: 32).  The newspapers also ignored Economic Development upon it appearance.  It is 
astonishing how what was to proved the most important Irish economic policy document 
garnered almost no attention upon publication, its significance initially recognised only by the 
entrepreneurial network (Whitaker and his colleagues within the Department of Finance) that 
fostered it and by Lemass the political entrepreneur who championed it.  However, gradually a 
variety of policy entrepreneurs such as the newspapers, trade unions and other interest groups 
came to support the ideas contained in Economic Development.  The result was a fundamental 
reappraisal of the policies pursued since the 1930s.   
In 1959, Lemass succeeded Éamon de Valera as Taoiseach.  The state of the economy, 
and the ideas propagated by Lemass and Whitaker, persuaded the opposition parties to support 
the government, as they came to “realised that the Irish economy could not survive in isolation” 
(Murphy, 1997: 57).  During the Dáil debate on Lemass‟ election as Taoiseach, the leader of the 
opposition party Fine Gael remarked that the magnitude of the economic problems could only 
be righted by a tremendous effort from all sections of the community (Dáil Éireann Debates, 2 
December, 1958, Vol. 171).  Daniel Desmond of the Labour Party argued it was time for the 
political establishment to realise that the problems with the economy superseded the party 
politics (Irish Independent, 1959b: 9).  Lemass said “the task of this generation is to consolidate the 
economic foundations of our political independence” (The Irish Times, 1959b: 8).  He stressed that 
“we have got to demonstrate beyond question the capacity to develop a viable economy” (Dáil 
Éireann Debates, 28 April, 1959, Vol. 174).  That there was consensus on this issue between such 
bitter rivals as Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, should not be underestimated.  While opposition 
parties might be expected to talk down an economy, when the government is in agreement with 
their evaluations, then normal politics has been suspended – a situation that only arises in 
democracies when they face severe challenges.  In the early summer of 1959, as Lemass was 
assuming power, the leading interest groups in society were beginning to row in behind what 
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Economic Development stood for (The Irish Times, 1959c: 9).  Lemass now had both the mandate and 
opportunity to inject the new ideas into the policy arena.  This fact, combined with the overall 
mood of economic despair in the country, was to permit Lemass slaughter a number of 
previously sacred political cows (Lee, 1989: 341).   
As Taoiseach (1959-1966) Lemass displayed a vigorous entrepreneurial leadership 
(McCarthy, 1973: 22).  Under his guidance, an outward-orientated economic strategy, containing 
increasingly liberal trade policies, became the bedrock of Irish macroeconomic policy (OECD, 
1962: 12; O‟Donnell, 1998: 4).  Joining the European Economic Community (EEC) became a 
central platform of this transformed policy paradigm.  Adjusting industries to competition led 
public policy into the realms of industrial relations and pay bargaining.  Lemass understood that 
the government had to play a more active role in the Irish economy, but realized that the success 
of this strategy assumed a new partnership with different interest groups, which would become 
players in the policy game (Murphy, 1997: 58).  The trade unions and employer organisations 
were brought into the policy-making environment.  Thus, “the dialogue between state and major 
socio-economic groups acquired a regular and institutional character” (Peillon, 1995: 370). 
During the economic crisis of the 1950s the coalition government‟s opening of the 
economy stretched the protectionist paradigm.  Extant policy‟s failure to deal with the economy‟s 
problems led to the collapse of ideas underlying protectionism.  This situation created a window 
of opportunity for Lemass, acting as the political entrepreneur, to replace protectionism, 
embedded over the preceding decades, with an outward orientated paradigm advocated by policy 
entrepreneurs such as Whitaker.  A strong advocacy coalition developed around Lemass and the 
ideas that he championed.  That Lemass was a senior politician fits with Campbell‟s (2004) 
argument that change is more likely if the political entrepreneur commands more resources.  The 
alternative policies implemented by Lemass punctuated the policy equilibrium with the result that 
a dramatic policy change ensued.   
5. Sweden 1981/1982 – The State of the Economy 
After the 1973 oil crisis Sweden experienced an enduring recession and stagflation.  Although 
among the world‟s richest countries, Sweden and its model of centralised corporatist collective 
bargaining began to strain under the burden of supporting its expansive social welfare system 
(Time International, 1976: 8).  The economy was no longer growing as fast as it had and the 
industrial sector – the source of Sweden‟s prosperity – began to shrink (Lundberg, 1982: 199).  
This contributed to the Social Democratic Party‟s (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP)) loss of 
power for the first time in 44 years in 1976.  The SAP had been the most dominant political party 
in Western European politics.  Thereafter, the SAP shifted more to the right of the political 
spectrum.  The non-socialist government commissioned reports on the economy that were 
infused with “the rising currents of monetarism, public choice theory, and neo-liberalism that 
were to come to the fore in the coming decade” (Andersson, 2006: 101).  The second oil crisis 
reinforced the impact of the first.  Economic performance during the first two years of the 1980s 
was poor.  Furthermore, in spite of the adjustment policies pursued by the authorities, correction 
of the imbalances that had built up since the 1970s was slow and the economy remained in 
disequilibrium (OECD, 1984: 7).   
Full employment came to depend increasingly on the expansion of the public sector 
(OECD, 1992: 62).  Consequently, growth in public expenditure outstripped the growth of the 
economy (OECD, 1984: 9).  The public sector‟s share of GNP rose under the non-socialists 
(1976-1982), so that by 1982 public sector expenditure constituted 67 percent of GNP (OECD, 
1990: 59).  This explains how the number of public sector jobs increased by 43 percent between 
1972 and 1982, coming to outnumber those in private industry after 1978 (Gress, 1988).  There 
were also signs of conflict between the growing army of public-sector employees and private 
sector counterparts.  “In the 1970s, wages exploded in a self-destructive series of agreements that 
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placed Swedish firms in the un-competitive position of having the highest paid labour force in 
the world” (Ahlén, 1989: 333). 
Productivity growth declined significantly from 1970 onwards, due to the size of the 
public-sector (Lindbeck, 1997).  This had a knock on effect on the level of exports, which 
stagnated over the decade (Ryden and Bergstrom, 1982).  Worryingly, Sweden‟s share of the 
world economy dropped 40 percent during that decade (Peterson, 1987).  Foreign competition 
made substantial inroads on the Swedish domestic market, as suggested by the steady rise in the 
share of imported manufactured goods (OECD, 1984: 12).  
Central government‟s expenditure grew at a faster pace by the end of the 1970s than at 
the beginning of the decade, while revenues stagnated.  With a sluggish economy, stagnant 
revenues and rising expenditures, the government‟s budget deficits accelerated during the 1970s, 
reaching 13 percent of GNP in 1982 (Siven, 1984: 17) five times its level in 1976 (Osnos, 1982: 
A15).  The Riksbank predicted that “the deficit on the national budget would grow from around 
SKr78 billion under the 1982-83 budget to some SKr90 billion in 1983-1984” (Dullforce, 1982: 
1).  By 1982 Sweden‟s debt/GNP ratio stood at 59.3 percent, whereas 12 month before it had 
been 50.8 percent, its growth an indication of the size of the budget deficit.  “In an international 
context, both the level of the budget deficit, and the swing in the budget balance since the mid-
1970s has been more pronounced than in most other OECD countries” (OECD, 1982: 16).  The 
budget deficits were financed through international borrowing and as a consequence, the 
debt/GNP ratio increased by 250 percent in the six years between 1976 and 1982 (Siven, 1984: 
17).  However, there was no political mandate for either radical budget cuts or revenue 
enhancements.  To avoid internal disputes, the non-socialists parties in government wanted 
neither to raise taxes nor be accused of trying to dismantle the welfare state (Branegan, 1982: 32).   
In 1981, inflation hit 12.1 percent and unemployment reached 3.1 percent in 1982, its highest 
level since 1945 (Appendix A).  Although this would have been a low figure elsewhere, it was a 
scandal in a country accustomed to full employment (Apple Jr., 1982: 3).  However, many 
economists believed unemployment was closer to 16 percent if it included the jobless in training 
programs, workers forced into early retirement and those who had given up looking for work 
(Branegan, 1982: 32).   
 
Table 2: Sweden‟s Main Economic Indicators, 1973 – 1983  
Year Unemploy- 
ment 
 
Inflation Government 
Debt to GNP  
Growth Rates 
in Real GDP 
Industrial 
Disputes days 
lost 
Economic 
Openness
1
 
 % % ratio % („000s)  
1973 2.5 6.7 22.6 3.9 12 50.90327 
1974 2.0 9.9 24.2 4.3 58 63.73183 
1975 1.6 9.8 24.4 2.2 366 55.24588 
1976 1.6 10.3 23.6 1.2 25 55.70874 
1977 1.8 11.4 26.5 -2.0 87 55.18196 
1978 2.2 10.0 31.8 1.3 37 54.19376 
1979 2.1 7.2 37.9 4.3 29 60.43795 
1980 2.0 13.7 43.2 1.9 4,478 60.14818 
1981 2.5 12.1 50.8 -0.6 209 59.64625 
1982 3.1 8.6 59.3 1.1 2 64.93382 
1983 3.5 9.0 64.6 1.8 37 68.92182 
Sources: Mitchell, B. R.  1993.  International Historical Statistics.  Europe 1750-1988.  (3rd ed.) Hong Kong: 
Stockton Press; Eurostat Yearbook 1997.  Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities; Heston, A., Summers, R. & B. Aten.  2002.  Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP); OECD, 1995.  Labour Force 
Statistics.  OECD: Paris; Statistical Annex of European Economy, Spring 2003. 
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For Swedes, the state of the economy constituted an unprecedented situation.  Economic 
growth, which had averaged 2.5 percent throughout the 1970s, contracted in 1981 and expanded 
by only 1 percent in 1982.  Figure 2 shows that all indicators of GDP growth were low in the 
early 1980s, while GNI per capita growth collapsed.  In the context of the international recession 
of the early 1980s, the budget deficit prevented the government pursuing a counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy.  
 
Figure 2: Sweden (1974-1984) GDP Growth(%); GDP per capita growth(%); GDP growth(5 yr. 
av); GNI per capita growth (%) 
 
Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
Branegan (1982: 32) argued that the Swedish economy, once the envy of Europe, had been 
hobbled by foreign debt, an adverse balance of payments, slow growth and unemployment.  
Compounding matters, Swedes were reluctant to see the welfare state cut back and to accept the 
remedies proposed to deal with their problems.  “„The welfare state is in a crisis of legitimacy‟”, 
observed Hans Vetterberg, Sweden‟s leading public opinion analyst, “„we can no longer afford to 
keep expanding it‟” (Osnos, 1982: A15). 
 
6. Sweden 1981/1982 – The Policy Response 
Although right wing parties formed a number of governments between 1976 and 1982, none was 
in a position to challenge the SAP as the single largest political party in Sweden.  On many issues 
the non-socialist parties remained divided (Peterson, 1987: 33), consequently the coalition could 
not agree on a set of policies to counteract the deteriorating economic situation (Olsen, 1984).  
Ironically, these right wing administrations nationalised and subsidised weak industries, 
something the SAP had resisted during its decades in power (OECD, 1978: 21).  Dagens Nyheter 
argues that until the massive expansion of the public sector Sweden experienced decades of 
consistent growth
1
.  The problem was that the public sector took up spare labour in a recession, 
but did not shed it during economic expansion.  Consequently, productivity in the private sector 
declined
2
.  The non-socialist parties‟ failure to improve economic performance led to 
                                                 
1 Dagens Nyheter, 27 January, 1991, p. 7. 
2 Dagens Nyheter, 3 January, 1992, p. 4.      
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disenchantment.  By 1981, the non-socialist coalition held only 102 of the 350 seats in the 
Riksdag
3
. 
In autumn 1981, a 10 percent devaluation of the krona was conducted and in the spring 
of 1982 the non-socialist coalition government introduced an austerity program.  The 
government hoped its attempts to combat the economy‟s problems would generate respect for 
non-socialist policies; instead they generated criticism and initiated a debate on the economy.  
The reductions in pensions, sick pay and subsidies for food, to slow the growing deficit, alienated 
large sections of an electorate already burdened with taxes (Time International, 1982: 23).  
Consequently, the opposition SAP gained in popularity (Hadenius, 1997: 129-30).   
The 1982 election, dominated by talk of economic crisis (Osnos 1982: A15), was regarded 
as determining whether public opinion had shifted away from social democracy.  Debates 
surrounding the economy failed to generate a coherent set of alternative ideas, although policy 
entrepreneurs such as the Swedish Employers‟ Federation (Svenska Arbetsgivarforening (SAF)) 
created Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS) and Timbro had begun to disseminate 
monetarist ideas (Blyth 2002: 214-15).  However, no political entrepreneur emerged during this 
period of ideational contestation.  This was primarily because no politician, for fear of electoral 
suicide, was willing to openly propose the abandonment of the welfare state, or its associated 
policies, despite the failure of these policies to meet contemporary challenges.  Legro (2000) 
argues that the failure of change agents to cluster around a new economic ideational paradigm 
means that societal actors will invariably re-embrace an existing orthodoxy.  
During the campaign the SAP, under Olof Plame, attacked the viability of another non-
socialist government.  The party presented a Crisis Programme on how Sweden could save and 
work its way out of the crisis.  This was to be a mildly reflationary programme, as a palliative for 
a public ill at ease with the economy‟s failings.  Nearly all the economic ideas they presented were 
variations upon existing themes.  In lieu of alternatives, the ideas underpinning the policies of the 
welfare state endured.  However, the problems with the economy deprived the non-socialist 
government of credibility (Mjoset, 1992).   
SAP won the election with a set of proposals to correct extant policies and by exploiting 
voters‟ growing fears over rising unemployment and their disenchantment with the policies of the 
outgoing Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin (Time International, 1982: 23).  With Olof Palme‟s 
return, traditional socialist policies went to the top of the agenda, albeit in altered form.  The SAP 
government‟s recovery program was entitled the Third Way (Apple Jr., 1982: 3).  It argued that 
renewed growth required redistribution of income from labour to capital.  This also marked a 
major change in SAP economic planning, behind which lay the influence of its research 
department which, since 1976, had achieved ascendancy over the Trade Union Confederation‟s 
(Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO)) research department within the labour movement (Meidner, 
1989).  The subsequent cuts in the public sector and restraint in wage negotiations resulted in 
divisions between the SAP and the LO (Andersson, 2006: 116).  Palme effectively rejected the 
non-socialists approach of squeezing inflation out of the economy at the risk of higher 
unemployment.  Instead, he intended to keep people in employment by paying them less and by 
giving Swedish industry a real cost advantage to allow for expansion.  This marked an attempt to 
demonstrate the SAP‟s capacity to revitalise the economy while maintaining a level of social 
democracy (Martin, 2000: 234; Walters, 1987: 65).       
The Third Way was a wide-ranging stabilization program encompassing demand 
management measures, as well as initiatives to promote structural change and ensure an equitable 
distribution of the burden of adjustment (OECD, 1984: 21).  The SAP was determined to pour 
funds into job-creating industries and to increase taxes for that purpose.  The party planned to 
spend $100 million, and hoped to attract an addition $350 million in private investment, to create 
40,000 jobs (Apple Jr., 1982: 3).  The centerpiece of Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt‟s strategy 
                                                 
3 http://www.const.sns.se/swedishpolitics/ 
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was the devaluation of the krona by 16 percent (Walters, 1987: 74).  The SAP had identified 
labour costs as the key to international competiveness.  This was implemented in conjunction 
with a price freeze and increases in sales and corporate taxes, in a sweeping “crisis plan” to 
stimulate the economy and eliminate its imbalances (Dullforce 1982: 1). 
According to the OECD (1984: 21) the objective was to achieve export led, investment-
driven, recovery.  The LO, the largest trade union association, accommodated devaluation by 
demanding average wage increases of 2.5 percent in ensuing bargaining.  The devaluation and 
international economic recovery resulted in high earnings and export expansion (Ahlén 1989: 
333).  The thrust of SAP policies pointed in a different direction than previously, with Feldt 
determined to give priority to private sector growth, profits and market forces.  A series of 
structural reforms were introduced overturning the traditional priorities of the SAP.  Under 
pressure for more individual freedom, and the internationalisation of the economy, these reforms 
saw the SAP move in a neo-liberal direction (Taylor, 1991: 3).   
Fiscal policy was held tight and the slimming of the public sector would, it was argued, 
create crowding in effects (Mjoset, 1992: 349).  The public sector austerity strategy, with a profit 
explosion and wage restraint, created tension between the SAP and LO.  Nevertheless, the 
government restored welfare entitlements cut by the non-socialists (OECD, 1984: 23).  To 
placate the LO, the SAP, in the face of SAF opposition, introduced wage-earner funds in 1983.  
In 1976 the LO proposed a levy on corporate profits be used to transfer control of enterprises 
with more than 50 employees to the unions.  At the time the SAP had been sceptical about the 
idea (Whyman and Burkitt, 1993: 612).  “Industrialists regarded the funds as a device to achieve 
bureaucratic control of industry” (Gress, 1988: 130).  However, the version implemented in 1983 
had been heavily modified from Rudolf Meidner‟s proposal in 1976 (Gould, 1993).  It was 
transformed “from an overtly socialist union proposal to a number of toothless share holding 
funds” (Meidner, 1993: 223).  Consequently, the modified version of the funds dissatisfied the 
LO (Lewin, 1985a: 296).  To maintain the welfare state the SAP had prioritized private sector 
growth.  The Third Way marked a reversal in the SAP‟s perspective on social policy, moving 
from an emphasis on investment in growth to an emphasis on cost reduction (Andersson, 2006: 
124). 
Despite social democracy‟s failures, Sweden, as a society, displayed a reluctance to 
abandon this model.  None of the political party leaders were willing to dismantle this pillar of 
Swedish society, as all sought to maintain its existence in one form or another.  On returning to 
office, the SAP reasserted its commitment to the Swedish model‟s precepts of an active role for 
government in stimulating economic growth and maintaining full employment (Walters, 1987: 
74).  The SAP presented its Third Way proposals for public expenditure cuts and prioritizing the 
private sector.  This strategy, while damaging the SAP‟s relationship with its trade union allies, 
contributed to Swedish economic expansion in conjunction with an international economy 
recovery.  The economic crisis provided a window of opportunity for the SAP to implement new 
economic policies that altered the established policy approach that had existed over the preceding 
decades.  The ad hoc changes made by the Palme government, to ensure that the welfare state 
endured, stretched extant economic philosophy.  Transferring increasing income from labour to 
capital undermined the extant philosophy‟s intellectual coherence.  For Kjellberg (1992: 88) this 
marked the demise of the Swedish Model.  As the Financial Times stated, Palme‟s return did not 
mean that socialism triumphed, but that the non-socialist parties had not succeeded in adjusting 
the expectations of the electorate to Sweden's straitened economic circumstances    
7. Conclusion  
In examining the Irish and Swedish policy responses to the economic crises, this article highlights 
the interdependence of politics and economics.  Conducting this examination within the context 
of the policy change literature assists our understanding of the process of policy change.   
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In Ireland, the failure of protectionist policy was compounded by a number of ad hoc 
amendments that undermined its coherence.  With extant economic policy punctuated, policy 
entrepreneurs‟ ideas on how to fix the economy attracted the attention of Seán Lemass who, 
playing the role of political entrepreneur, used the window of opportunity the economic crisis 
had created to take economic policy in a different direction.  Political consensus developed 
around the new policy idea of free trade, which saw a transformation in the hierarchy of the goals 
behind economic policy.  As a result, Ireland adopted a radically different approach to managing 
its economy.  This move was to reverse a policy course that the wider Irish political elite had 
followed slavishly for a generation. 
In Sweden, economic policy was failing by the beginning of the 1980s.  This was due to a 
combination of the after effects of the oil crises and a bloated welfare state.  However, no 
politician wanted to challenge the monolithic welfare state, despite the fact that it did not seem to 
be accommodating capitalism any longer.  As a result, a genuine policy alternative did not 
emerge, with the SAP only shifting economic policy to the centre with its Third Way programme.  
This programme, placing priority on private sector growth and initiative while shrinking the 
public sector, was seen as necessary to make the economy more dynamic and growth oriented in 
order to maintain a level of social democracy.  Thus, the overarching economic policy remained 
largely intact.  However, ad hoc alternations to this policy only served to undermine its 
intellectual coherence, as had happened in Ireland with protectionism almost 30 years before.  
Nevertheless, Sweden soldiered on with its faltering policy, reluctant to confront its limitations.   
 In both countries, economic crises provided windows of opportunity for policy changes 
to occur.  Extant macroeconomic policy failed in Ireland in the 1950s and in Sweden in the early 
1980s, with the result that the ideas underlying extant macroeconomic policy collapsed.  In the 
wake of perceived policy failure the critical issue was for policy entrepreneurs to come forward 
with alternative ideas on how to fix the economy and for these ideas to find a champion in the 
political environment.  Thus, new ideas and the positions of those who champion these ideas, are 
crucial in determining the nature of the policy change that occurs in response to policy failure.  
Policy failure on its own is not sufficient for policy change to occur.     
The cases examined here are not purely of historical interest.  They serve to illustrate the 
cross national diversity of crisis experiences and responses that always has to be recognised in 
political economy analysis.  In the wake of the current global financial crisis we have been 
presented with the spectacle a range of countries, as well as sub national jurisdictions, struggling 
to prevent economic collapse.  Iceland has seen its financial system fail spectacularly; Greece and 
Ireland are both in the midst of political and economic turmoil that has raised serious questions 
about the future of both the Euro and the wider European Project.  There are growing concerns 
about the sovereign debt situations in Portugal, Spain, and Italy.  California, ground zero for the 
US subprime mortgage debacle, is being referred to as a failed economy and a failed state (Harris, 
2009: 32).  Thus, the historical issues considered in this paper have a significant contemporary 
echo. 
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